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JUSTICE
ever in history has so much attention been paid to 
human movement. Global migration yields 
demographic shifts of historical significance, profoundly 
shaking up world politics – as shown by the “refugee 
crisis,” the rise of White nationalism in the United States, 
and the spreading of the populist right in Europe. Global 
migration is one of the defining issues of the 21st century, 
challenging the fabric of Western societies, remodeling 
the essence of sovereignty, and changing the way we think 
of borders and boundaries.
There are ten reasons why international migration is 
one of the greatest challenges of our time. The ten reasons 
are related to fundamental changes in the patterns of 
migration in Western societies, and in the world as a whole. 
Indeed, migration will be at the center of world politics 
in the years to come.
International Migration
The first reason relates to numbers. The world is on the 
move: There were 258 million international migrants in 
2017, a record of 65 million forcibly displaced people, 50 
million irregular migrants, 21 million forced laborers, and 
740 million “internal migrants.” While it is true that the 
percentage of international migrants remains relatively 
constant – 2.6% of the world population in 1960 and 3.4% 
in 2017 – it is seven times higher in the developed regions 
than in the developing regions. On the regional level, 
international migration has almost tripled in Europe – it 
climbed from 3.4% of the population in 1960 to 10.5% in 
2017 (not including intra-European mobility) – and 
doubled in North America, from 6.7% (1960) to 16% (2017). 
On the national level, the numbers are even higher (see 
Table 1). All predictions show that migration will continue 
to grow tremendously in the near future. People will have 
more reasons to move to the developed world and more 
resources to do so.
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TABLE 1: INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF THE TOTAL POPULATION BY SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960-
2017
Country Percentage
 1960 1990 2017 
Belgium 4.8 8.9 11.1
Denmark  2.1 4.6 11.5
France 7.7 10.4 12.2
Germany - 7.5 14.8
Ireland 2.6 6.4 16.9
Italy 0.9 2.5 10.0
Norway 1.7 4.5 15.1
Spain 0.7 2.1 12.8
The Netherlands 3.9 7.9 12.1
United Kingdom 3.2 6.4 13.4
United States 5.8 9.2 15.3
Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, 2017.
Global migration is only one aspect of human mobility. 
There are about 1.5 billion international border crossings 
every year. Tourists, students, business people, and 
temporary workers come and go on a regular basis. Free 
movement zones, such as the Schengen area and the 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 
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and technology – low-cost flights, high-speed trains, and 
the availability of apartments via Airbnb – have led to an 
increase in the number of visitors. Anti-tourism protests 
are spreading today across Europe. Local residents complain 
that tourism generates noise, pollution, and traffic, and 
leads to an increase in rents, decrease in parking spaces, 
and the ousting of locals. “Tourists go home” is now a 
popular slogan in European cities. Venice, Dubrovnik, and 
Barcelona have introduced legal measures to restrict the 
influx of visitors. In other places, such as Beijing, internal 
migrants – the Chinese rural residents who move to the 
big city in search of a better life – are also faced with 
restrictions on their freedoms and provoke grumbles.
The changing character of migration is a second reason 
for the perceived migration “crisis.” Until recent decades, 
migration consisted mainly of labor workers. Today, 
however, family migration presents the largest share of 
migrants in the West – more than 50% when excluding 
refugees and asylum seekers. Family migration has four 
features: (a) it is usually not temporary; (b) it is more 
difficult to restrict family migration because citizens have 
a right to family life; (c) it is likely to increase migration 
– studies show that family ties in a different country are 
the most important factors in the decision to move to a 
new country, more important than wages and human 
development; (d) it is not discretionary. Countries do not 
really “select” family migrants based on skills and merits; 
they arrive on the basis of legal entitlement. In addition, 
in some countries, migrants are coming from societies 
that profess a different religion than the majority 
population. In Europe, when excluding intra-EU 
movement, 39% of the total migration to the Union 
comprise people of Muslim faith.
The intensity of these changes is the third reason. The 
rapid pace of demographic changes we are witnessing now 
happened in the past only as a result of wars or occupation, 
not migration. There is a sense of a high traffic load. In just 
five decades, European states have turned from countries 
of emigration to immigrant-receiving societies on a large 
scale. While data do not support the popular claim that 
Muslims are likely to become a majority by 2030 in Europe 
– that is fake news – Muslims will become a sizeable 
religious minority in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, and 
Sweden. In the United States, white Americans are expected 
to be a minority (46%) by 2050; in contrast, Hispanic 
Americans, a tiny minority in 1960, are expected to reach 
30% of the population by 2050. This fast-changing reality 
generates cultural anxiety in Western societies.
The fourth reason is the fact that migration has also 
become associated with cultural and security challenges. 
There is a growing body of literature on the cultural gaps 
between migrant and local communities, especially in 
Europe, dealing with issues such as liberal values (for 
example, free speech, gender equality, and gay rights); 
the rule of law vis-à-vis the rule of God; the legitimacy 
of the use of violence in resolving political conflicts; and 
the role of religion in the public sphere. The findings are 
troubling and indicate that these gaps are often wider in 
second and third generation immigrants than among their 
parents and grandparents. In addition, violent riots and 
terrorist acts have made the issue of migration central 
and visible.
Western Societies
The fifth reason relates to Western demographic changes. 
In almost all Western countries, the Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR), the number of children that a woman bears over 
her lifetime, has dropped below the “replacement rate” 
of 2.1, which is the fertility rate required for demographic 
stability (see Table 2). Low fertility rates, combined with 
high life expectancy, affect the “old-age support ratio,” 
which measures the number of people of working age 
(15-64) in relation to the number of people of retirement 
age (65+). Some states have already reached the point at 
which the elderly will outnumber the young. This means 
fewer people of working age and more people in need of 
welfare stipends, pensions, and healthcare. In fact, if 
Western states want to maintain their welfare systems, 
migration is inevitable.
Country Total Fertility Rate Old-Age Support Ratio
1955-60 2015-20 2015 2050
Belgium 2.50 1.80 3.6 2.3
Denmark 2.55 1.76 3.4 2.6
France 2.69 1.97 3.3 2.3
Germany 2.27 1.47 3.1 2.0
Ireland 3.58 1.98 4.4 2.4
Italy 2.29 1.49 2.9 1.6 
Spain 2.70 1.39 3.5 1.5 
The Netherlands 3.10 1.75 3.6 2.3
United Kingdom 2.49 1.87 3.5 2.5
United States 3.58 1.89 4.5 3.0
TABLE 2: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE AND OLD-AGE SUPPORT 
RATIO BY SELECTED COUNTRIES AND YEARS




not even all individuals, are equal; the existence of 
multiculturalism thus depends on the premise that the 
dominant culture recognizes the idea of equality. 
Paradoxically, it is the expansion of minority rights that 
gives rise to the revival of “majority nationalism” and 
puts multiculturalism at risk.
Global Transitions
The eighth reason relates to dramatic geopolitical 
changes. The global population has rapidly grown – one 
billion in 1804 to almost eight billion in 2018. This 
profound growth, however, has mainly occurred in the 
developing countries: e.g., India, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Indonesia. The European population shriveled from 
25% of the global population in 1900 to 12% in 2000 and, 
if current trends continue, only seven percent of the world 
population will remain “European” by 2050 (see Table 
3). This dramatic demographic transition is likely to lead 
to increased mobility to Europe, that will sharpen the 
moral panic against migration.
The sixth reason relates to the Western identity crisis. 
From Australia to Britain, France to Germany, countries 
are struggling with a similar question: how to cultivate 
a common “bond” that goes beyond the global economy 
and political liberalism; a bond that is global and yet, 
keeps a core that distinguishes the “here” from the “there.” 
In the post-World War II international system, Western 
countries did not need to set boundaries to their national 
identity; it was a given, not something that had to be 
defined. But times have changed. Migration – together 
with globalization forces, the rise of multiculturalism and, 
in Europe, the creation of the EU – have led to a reality 
in which it becomes difficult to know what it means to 
have a national identity. We are witnessing an interesting 
phenomenon in which states seek to protect their unique 
identity, but cannot clearly specify what it is. It includes, 
at best, a local version of political liberalism and popular 
culture like films, carnivals, and sports. The very idea of 
searching for national identity is the clearest indicator of 
its devaluation. Newcomers arrive in societies that are 
insecure about the essence of their identity.
The seventh reason relates to multiculturalism – which 
has become popular in Western societies in the last 
decades. Cultural group rights – demands for linguistic 
rights, Shari’a law, and exemptions from general laws 
relating to school curriculum and food – are the fashion 
of the day. At the infancy of multiculturalism, there was 
a clear distinction between “national minorities” and 
“immigrant groups.” Unlike national minorities that often 
cannot choose between different ways of life without 
cultural privileges, migrants can choose. Voluntary 
migration is exactly this – an expression of choice. Yet the 
proposition that migrants seek to integrate into the national 
culture, rather than to maintain their original cultural 
identities, no longer describes the Western reality. Cultural 
group rights, originally developed for minorities, are 
demanded nowadays by immigrant groups in the West.
Multiculturalism is based on some false assumptions. 
To begin with, it protects only “needy” minorities, whose 
culture, without legal protection, may be marginalized 
or excluded. But not every minority group is culturally 
“needy,” and not all majority groups are not culturally 
needy. In addition, multiculturalism has failed to 
distinguish between “illiberal minorities,” which do not 
seek to change the liberal way of life of a political 
community (e.g., the Amish), and “anti-liberal minorities,” 
that seek to use their political power to change the way 
of life of others, non-members in the group. And last, the 
idea that all cultures are equal is logically false. There are 
cultures that do not recognize the idea that all cultures, 
Area 1900 1950 2000 2050 
World 1,650 2,519 6,071 9,772
   More Developed 33% 32% 20% 13%
   Less Developed 67% 68% 80% 86%
Africa 8% 9% 13% 26%
Asia 55% 56% 61% 54%
Europe 25% 22% 12% 7%
Latin America 
& the Caribbean 
6% 7% 9% 8%
North America 6% 6% 5% 5%
Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, 2017.
TABLE 3: CHANGES IN THE WORLD POPULATION, 1900-2050 
IN PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
Geopolitics has changed not only geographically, but 
also religiously. Islam is the rising demographic star of 
the last century. The Muslim population made up twenty 
percent of the world population in 1990, and it is expected 
to be 26.4% in 2030. A Pew Research Center study indicates 
that in 2030, nearly three out of ten children in the world 
will be Muslim.
The ninth reason relates to global transport. People can 
live today in one country while retaining close ties with 
another country; distances are becoming shorter and 
moving costs are becoming lower. Cheap transport and 
communications facilitate the existence of “inside-out 
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communities,” that physically reside inside a country yet 
culturally remain outside. The forces of globalization 
narrow the cultural gaps in the world (say, between Europe 
and India), yet global transport still makes them more 
visible. Ideas come and go – through free markets, 
international media, and the Internet – and the notion of 
cultural exceptionalism faces multiple challenges. The 
“other” is present not just physically, but also spiritually. 
Even if a state can control the flow of migrants, it cannot 
control the flow of ideas and cultures.
The tenth reason relates to digitalization. The concept 
of national citizenship is no longer sacred and it has even 
become a commodity that is put up for sale; on some 
islands in the Pacific Ocean, it is even possible to buy 
citizenship with Bitcoin. Emerging technologies offer non-
territorial forms of political membership that transcend 
national borders and boundaries, challenging the definition 
of the “state” as we know it and weakening the state as 
a primary source of identity and rights. These technological 
changes occur regardless of migration; however, in this 
context, migrants are often unjustly blamed for the erosive 
effects of globalization and migration has become the 
axis on which contemporary dilemmas in the liberal state 
meet.
Almost every mass migration in recent history has been 
perceived as sui generis, a new case, and generated fears 
of “the other.” Is the challenge different this time? The 
answer is disputable. Some would argue that the current 
situation is not historically unique. Maybe. If we single 
out each of the ten changes described here, we may find 
historical precedents for each. Yet, the combination of all 
of them at one point has no precedent. Current debates 
challenge some of the most fundamental assumptions on 
international migration and require new approaches to 
governing migration.
At the heart of the issue are human rights; not only the 
tragic stories of thousands of people who die every year 
in an attempt to find a better life, but also millions of 
people whose lives are at risk in their home country. The 
Somali poet Warsan Shire powerfully noted: “No one puts 
their children in a boat, unless the water is safer than the 
land.” Yet, any future regime must go beyond a 
humanitarian approach to address the root causes of the 
crisis. Another wall, smarter border, or criminal sanctions 
are just an incremental solution to a wider picture; a 
complete reassessment of the challenges and consequences 
is essential for global political sustainability. Disregarding 
the challenges is not only theoretically wrong, but also 
politically unwise, given the growing popularity of 
extreme right-wing movements in the West. n
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